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RECENT CASE NOTES
INJUNCTION-CARRIERS-RTES-CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW-This is an
action by twenty-three railroad companies seeking to set aside an order of
the Public Service Commission of Indiana as "unjust, arbitrary, unreasonable, and illegal." This order reduced carload freight rates on scrap iron
and steel moving in intrastate commerce in Indiana, and was issued on
complaint of shippers, after an investigation of the reasonableness and
lawfuhness of such rates. Appellee's evidence consisted of affidavits that
the order if permitted to become effective would reduce the rates thirty-six
per cent, and set forth the reductions in amounts. The total reduction
was set forth in one as one-hundred thousand dollars. Appellants filed an
affidavit, which conflicted with the allegations of the complaint, setting
out that the existing rates were not "unjust, unreasonable, exorbitant,
discriminatory, or in any wise unlawful," and that order of the Commission was not "arbitrary, unjust, unreasonable, and illegal." A demurrer to
the complaint was filed and overruled, a general denial was filed, and, after
a hearing, a temporary injunction was issued. The Commission appealed.
Held. Judgment reversed with direction to dissolve the temporary
injunction. Public Service Commission of Indiana et al. v. Baltimore and
Ohio et al., Supreme Court of Indiana (Jan. 16, 1930), 169 N. E. 530.
Two main points are involved in this case. The first is in regard to the
issuing of a temporary injunction. The court held that there must be at
least a prima facie showing that complainant is entitled to final relief
before it could be obtained. This departs from the language of the prior
Indiana cases. The rule as stated in Risch v. Burch, 175 Ind. 621, was,
"that to authorize a court to grant such relief, it is not necessary that a
case be made out that will entitle the plaintiff to relief at all events on the
final hearing, and that on appeal the discretion of the court will not be
interfered with, when there is no abuse of that discretion, and that an order
will be upheld where complaint and the evidence show the transaction in
question is a proper subject of investigation in a court of equity." The
same language is found in City of LaPorte v. Scott, 166 Ind. 78, Spicer v.
Hoop, 51 Ind. 365, and Washington Water Power Co. v. Crane, 233 P. 878,
uses that language and cites Spicer v. Hoop. "It is not necessary that the
court be satisfied that plaintiff will certainly prevail on the final hearing,
a probable right and a probable danger that such right will be defeated
without the interposition of Equity, is all that need be shown. When there
is grave doubt as to the complainants right, preliminary relief will generally be denied." Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 1685. Language similar to that in the principal case is found in Atkinson v. Roosevelt County,
214 P. 74, where it was said, "allowance of a temporary injunction is vested
largely in the sound legal discretion of the court, which will not be disturbed except in cases of manifest abuse. The party seeking relief by
temporary injunction has the burden of establishing a prima facie right to
it." Similarly, Blackstone Hall Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.,
39 R. I. 69, 97 A. 484; Fritz v. Presby, 16 A. 419. See Rowland v. Kellog
Power Co., 233 P. 869, where it says such relief will be granted if plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case, or if it appears from the pleadings that a
case is presented proper for investigation on the final hearing. The language of these two lines of cases is different but it is clear that the principal case would have had the same result under either if they be taken
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to be different rules and not merely a distinction in choice of words. There
exists a presumption in favor of the order of the Commission. Vandalia
R .R. v. Schnull, 188 Ind. 87, 122 N. E. 225. To rebut this appellee introduced no evidence that the order was "arbitrary, unjust, unreasonable, and
illegal." The affidavits cannot serve that purpose as they merely charge
that there will be a reduction of returns on that kind of freight. L. & N. v.
Garret, 231 U. S. 298. Nor can the allegations of the complaint serve that
purpose. First, because there is a conflict of evidence between the affidavits; second, it is necessary to introduce the complaint into evidence for
it to become a part of the evidence. (Sec. 1228, Burns', 1926); third, even
if complaint were a part of the evidence, it would not be sufficient to sustain the granting of the temporary injunction as it merely alleges the
conclusions of the pleader that the existent rates were not "unjust, etc.,"
and that the order of the Commission was "arbitrary, etc." These are
regarded as conclusions of law and therefore are not to be considered as
allegations of the facts necessary to support the conclusion under Sec. 360,
Burns', 1926; Central Bank v. Martin, 70 Ind. A. 387, 121 N. E. 57. As to
the distinctions between evidentiary facts, operative facts, and conclusions
of law it is difficult to define the dividing line. "It is conceded that no one
has as yet defined the term 'conclusion of law' with such exactness and
nicety that the definition will always be the true test." Text-writers have
been content with stating that certain specific allegations are conclusions
of law. Benson v. Pedio, 6 Alaska 1. Cook, 21 Columbia L. R. 416, says
a "conclusion of law' is a generic statement of the application of some
legal rule to a specific group of facts; that it is as true under the Code as
at Common Law that a large portion of the accepted methods of statements
are in form mixed statements of the "dry actual facts" and the legal conclusions therefrom; that how specific or how generic allegations may, or
must be, cannot be settled by mere logic, but according to notions of fairness and convenience; that judicial precedent has emerged, as a basis for
guidance, from the chaos resulting from the substitution of the simple,
but ambiguous, provision in the Code; that the complaint shall contain
"the statement of the facts constituting the cause of action in plain,
concise language, without repetition," for the Common Law forms and
precedents.
In accord with the determination of the court in the principal case,
that the allegations were conclusions of law, see Silberchain v. U. S., 285
F. 397, where allegations that the decision of a Board was "arbitrary,
unjust, and unlawful" were held' conclusions of law; Benson v. Pedio, 6
Alaska 1, where averments that certain demands "are not lawful," that
a proceeding was "unauthorized, without force and effect, and void," that
an act was or was not done "as required by law" were held to be conclusions of law; Estrada v. Kreeger Store, 84 S. 786, that allegation that
arrest was "unwarranted" and "unjust," and that prosecution was "unfounded" were determined conclusions of law; Sanders State Bank v. Hawkins, 142 S. W. 84, that allegation that state officers in closing the bank
acted "without authority of law," is a conclusion of law.
The allegations in the principal case are of the same type, and identical
in some instances, and are clearly, on authority, conclusions of law.
H. N. F.

